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Multiple-Quality Cournot Oligopoly and the Role of Market Size
Abstract: We model an oligopoly where firms can choose the quality level of their
products by incurring set-up costs that generally depend on quality level. If the set-up cost
is independent of product quality, firms may choose to supply both types of quality.We focus
on the long run equilibrium where free entry and exit ensure that the profit for each type of
firm is zero. Using this framework, we study the implications of an increase in the market
size. We show that for the existence of an equilibrium where some firms specialize in the low
quality product it is necessary that the set-up cost for the lower quality product, adjusted
for quality level, is lower than that for the higher quality product. In the case where the unit
variable costs are zero, or they are proportional to quality level (so that unit variable costs,
adjusted for quality, are the same), we show that an increase in the market size leads to (i) an
increase in the fraction of firms that specialize in the high quality products, (ii) the market
shares (both in value terms and in terms of volume of output) of high quality producers
increases, and (iii) the prices of both types of product decrease. In the case where higher
quality requires higher set-up cost (per unit of quality) but lower unit variable cost (per unit
of quality), subject to certain bounds on the difference in unit variable costs, we obtain the
result that an increase in the market size decreases the number of low quality firms, increases
the number of high quality firms, and decreases the prices of both products. In the special
case where the set up cost is independent of quality level, we find that all firms will produce
both type of quality levels. In this case, an increase in the market size will reduce the value
shares of low quality products, but will leave their volume share unchanged; and the market
expansion induces a fall in the relative price of the low quality product, and in the prices of
both products in terms of the numeraire good. We carry out an empirical test of a version of
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the model, where set-up costs now refer to set-up costs to establish an export market, and
they vary according to the quality of product that the firm exports to that market. We show
that the data supported the hypothesis that the average qualities of the product are higher
for bigger export markets.
JEL classifications: L10, L13, L19
Keywords: Multiproduct firms; Cournot competition; Vertical product differentiation;
Cost structure; Market size.
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1 Introduction
In many oligopolistic industries, firms supply a variety of products that differ mainly in
terms of quality. Some firms are known to specialize in products of high quality while others
occupy the lower end of the quality spectrum. The purpose of this paper is to study the role
of the market size on the average quality level of the vertically differentiated products that
an oligopolistic industry produces.
Trade liberalization is one of major factors that have contributed to the expansion of
market size. In the international trade literature, the effect of market size expansion on
consumers’ welfare has been largely studied using the monopolistic competition framework,
where firms produce horizontally differentiated products (Krugman, 1980; Melitz, 2003; Me-
litz and Trefler, 2012), and trade gains are explained in terms of the lowering of prices and
the increase in the number of horizontally differentiated product varieties that the average
consumer has access to. The decrease in prices is due to the expansion of the scale of operati-
ons of the representative firm, which reduces the firm’s average cost. While the monopolistic
competition framework is convenient, the CES utility function assumed in this literature
(e.g., Melitz, 2003) produces the counterfactual result that the ratio of equilibrium over the
constant unit variable cost is itself a constant, independent of the market size. In our paper,
we assume instead that firms are oligopolists, and the industry produces both high and low
quality products. 1
Our model is built on Johnson and Myatt (2006), where firms can choose the quality
levels from a discrete set {S1, S2, ..., Sm}, and they compete in quantities, taking the inverse
1Long et al. (2011) assume that firms are oligopolists and focus on ex-ante cost heterogeneity. Their
paper however assumes that the all the firms in the industry produce the same homogenous products. Our
paper distinguishes low quality products from high quality products.
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demand function for each quality type as given. However, we replace their assumption that
all firms incur the same set-up cost (regardless of the quality of the product that firms offer)
with a more plausible one: firms that wish to specialize in the lower quality product incur
a lower set-up cost than that of firms that produce the high quality product. In addition,
while Johnson and Myatt (2006) are mainly concerned with the short run equilibrium, where
the number of firms are fixed, the focus of our model is the long run equilibrium, where free
entry and exit ensures that profit is zero. Using this framework, we study the implications of
an increase in the market size. We show that for the existence of an equilibrium where some
firms specialize in the low quality product it is necessary that the set-up cost for the lower
quality product, adjusted for quality level, is lower than that for the higher quality product.
In the case where the unit variable costs are zero, or they are proportional to quality level (so
that unit variable costs, adjusted for quality, are the same), we show that an increase in the
market size leads to (i) an increase in the fraction of firms that specialize in the high quality
products, (ii) the market shares (both in value terms and in terms of volume of output) of
high quality producers increases, and (iii) the prices of both types of product decrease. In
the case where higher quality requires higher set up cost (per unit of quality) but lower unit
variable cost (per unit of quality), subject to certain bounds on the difference in unit variable
costs, we obtain the result that an increase in the market size decreases the number of low
quality firms, increases the number of high quality firms, and decreases the prices of both
products. In the special case where the set up cost is independent of quality level, we find
that all firms will produce both type of quality levels. In this case, an increase in the market
size will reduce the value shares of low quality products, but will leave their volume share
unchanged; and the market expansion induces a fall in the relative price of the low quality
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product, and in the prices of both products in terms of the numeraire good.
We carry out an empirical test of a version of the model, where set-up costs now refer to
set-up costs to establish an export market, and they vary according to the quality of product
that the firm exports to that market. We show that the data supported the theoretical
prediction that the market share of the high quality product increases in the market size.
This paper is related to the theoretical work of Fajgelbaum, Grossman and Helpman
(2011) concerning quality differentiation in international trade between the North (the rich
countries) and the South (the poor countries). However, while our model assumes oligopoly
(i.e. firms choose their strategies and are aware of strategic interactions among them), the
model of Fajgelbaum, Grossman and Helpman (2011) assumes monopolistic competition (i.e.,
there are no strategic interactions among firms). Under oligopoly, each firm knows that the
quantities and/or qualities chosen by its rivals depend on their knowledge of the firm’s cost
and strategy. In contrast, under monopolitic competition, each firm takes as given the market
aggregates (such as aggregate expenditure on the products of the industry, and the industry
price level), and sets its own price, as if it were a monopolist. In Fajgelbaum, Grossman and
Helpman (2011) firms set prices, each assuming that its price has no effects on the industry’s
price index (this is the standard assumption of the monopolistic competition model). In our
model, each firm decides on its output, knowing that its output will affect the industry’s
output and hence prices. Another difference between our model and Fajgelbaum, Grossman
and Helpman (2011) is that we assume that the market is not fully covered, i.e., there are
some consumers that do not buy the product of the industry under study: they spend their
entire income on the numeraire good which is produced by a perfectly competitive sector.
As pointed out by Motta (1993, page 116) and others, the assumption that the market is not
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fully covered is made so that the inverse demand functions for various quality levels can be
derived from the consumers’ demand. In contrast, in Fajgelbaum, Grossman and Helpman
(2011) there is no need to have inverse demand functions, as firms set prices directly. Another
major difference is that in Fajgelbaum, Grossman and Helpman (2011) the marginal rate of
substitution between quality (of the differentiated goods) with quantity of the numeriare good
depends on the level of income. (We will discuss this in more details in the next section).
2 A brief literature review
This section provides a brief review of the literature on oligopoly with vertically differentiated
products. There are two canonical approaches regarding the costs of producing higher quality
products. The first approach assumes that to produce a higher quality product, a firm must
pay a higher fixed cost, while the variable costs are independent of quality level. The fixed
costs may be regarded as R&D costs. The second approach assumes that to produce a higher
quality product, the firm must incur higher variable cost per unit of output, and there are no
fixed costs. This corresponds to situations where production of higher quality goods require
the use of more qualified labor or more expensive intermediate inputs. The first approach
was adopted by authors such as Shaked and Sutton (1982, 1983, 1984), Bonanno (1986),
Ireland (1987), Motta (1993, Part II). Studies using the second approach includes Mussa and
Rosen (1987), Gal-Or (1983), Champsaur and Rochet (1989), Motta (1993, Part III), and
Johnson and Myatt (2006).
Concerning the mode of competition, most authors assume Bertrand competition with
heterogeneous consumers. Gabszewicz and Thisse (1989, 1980) and Shaked and Sutton (1982,
1983) consider a duopoly where one firm produces the high quality product and the other
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firm produces the low quality product, and the firms compete by setting the prices. Champ-
saur and Rochet (1989) also restrict attention to a duopoly with Bertrand competition, but
allow each firm to be a multi-product firm. (See also Tirole,1988, and Choi and Shin, 1992,
for Bertrand competition in the case where the market is fully covered.) A number of aut-
hors assume quantity competition (Bonanno, 1986, Gal-Or, 1983,Johnson and Myatt, 2006).
Motta (1993) consider both types of competition. Most authors assume that the number of
firms are fixed, though Johnson and Myatt (2006) also discuss the long run equilibrium when
free entry eliminates excess profit.
Concerning the choice of quality levels, many authors assume that firms can choose any
level of quality in a continuum [Smin, Smax]. Johnson and Myatt (2006), in contrast, assume
firms must choose quality levels from a discrete set, {S1, S2, ..., Sm}, and they use the upgrade
approach: each firm can upgrade a low quality product to higher quality product by incurring
an upgrade cost (a variable cost, not a fixed cost). It is as if the firm must produce an
additional component to turn a low quality unit into a higher quality unit. The authors
make direct assumptions on the consumers’ valuation of upgrades. In their model, upgrading
involves an increase in the marginal cost, but no increase in fixed costs: whether a firm
produces a low quality product, or a high quality product, or both, the fixed cost is the
the same. As an extension of Johnson and Myatt (2006), Cheng and Peng (2012) studies
the conditions for the firm to commit to produce single quality level of products under a
duopoly-quantity competition framework. They assume the set-up cost is the same for both
the high and low quality products. When the set-up fixed cost is high enough, one firm will
exit the market, and the surviving firm will provide the single quality level of products. Our
analysis is different from Cheng and Peng (2012) relaying on two points: firstly, the set-up
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costs for different quality products are not necessary to be identical; secondly, the market
allows free entry of firms instead of being assumed as duopoly competition.
In our paper, we take a more general approach: high quality products involve both higher
fixed costs (e.g. more expensive plants and other overhead costs), as well as higher variable
costs.
On the specification of demand, the typical specification is that each consumer buys at
most one unit of the product.2 This seems a reasonable specification for products such as
cars, smart phones, computers, etc. It is assumed consumers are heterogeneous with respect
to a taste parameter θ. A consumer of type θ has the net utility function uθ = θS − p where
S is the quality of the product, and p is its price. The parameter θ can also be interpreted as
the consumer’s marginal rate of substitution between income and quality, so that a higher θ
corresponds to a lower marginal utility of income; in other words, a consumer with a higher
income would have a higher θ (see Tirole, 1988, p. 96). Indeed, in Gabszewicz and Thisse
(1979, 1980), Shaked and Sutton (1982, 1983, 1984), Bonanno (1986), and Ireland (1987),
consumers are supposed to be heterogeneous in terms of income.
A simple formulation is that there are only two firms in the industry (Motta, 1993): one
firm (say firm 1) produces the high quality product, while the other produces the low quality
product. Motta (1993) assumes that the market is not fully covered, i.e., in equilibrium,
some set of consumers will choose not to purchase, because their θ is too low relative to the
price of either product.3
2In a different class of models, consumers are identical and and buy more than one unit, see Sutton (1991)
and Motta (1992a, 1992b). In these models, under Cournot competition, firms will choose the same quality.
3As pointed out by Motta (1993), if the market is fully covered, then total demand is independent of
the prices, and thus the demand functions cannot be inverted, and hence one cannot consider Cournot
competition. Note that if the lowest θ is zero, then it is automatically true that the market is not fully
covered.
9
Motta (1993, part I) assumes that fixed cost is quadratic in quality: for any quality level
S in the continuum of feasible qualities [Smin,Smax], the associated fixed cost is FS = S
2/2.
This implies that the quality-adjusted fixed cost, fS ≡ (1/S)FS, is S/2, and thus the quality-
adjusted fixed cost increases in quality level, i.e., if SH > SL then fSH = SH/2 > fSL ≡ SL/2.
(In our paper, we do not restrict to the quadratic specification). Under this assumption,
Motta (1993) considers a two-stage games between two firms. In the first stage, they choose
the quality level (and incur the associated fixed cost), and in the second stage, they compete
as two Cournot rivals (or alternative, as two Betrand rivals). Motta (1993) finds that when
both firms know they will compete as Cournot rivals, their quality differentiation will be
relatively small (the ratio of high quality to low quality is about 2) while if they know they
will compete as Bertrand rivals, they will choose quality levels that are further apart (the
ratio of high quality to low quality is about 5). The intuition behind this result is that
since price competition tends to be fiercer than quantity competition (for any given pairs of
quality levels), the firms will try to differentiate their products more to reduce rivalry.4 The
result that Bertrand firms tend to have greater vertical differentiation of quality is robust: if
costs of quality improvements are variable costs rather than fixed costs, the same principle
applies.5
Concerning profits in the case of where the quality-adjusted fixed costs increase with
quality, Motta (1993) finds that in the case of duopoly, the sum of profits is higher under
4If the fixed costs are zero, or do not increase too mucg with quality, and variable costs are zero, and the
upper bound Smax is low, so that at Smax the marginal cost of quality is lower than the marginal revenue
of quality, the two Cournot firms will both choose the highest quality level, Smax. See Bonanno (1982) and
Ireland (1987, pp.71-74).
5Under Bertrand competition, Shaked and Sutton (1982) show that if there are neither fixed costs nor
variable costs, the two firms will choose two different quality levels, S1 = Smax and S2 is higher than Smin.
In Shaked and Sutton (1984), if fixed costs exist and are strongly increasing in quality level, then S1 < Smax.
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Bertrand rivalry.6 However, this result is reversed if quality improvement involve higher
variable costs rather than higher fixed costs. Under either specification of the costs of quality,
consumers are always better off under Bertrand competition.
Gal-Or (1983, 1985, 1987) and Motta (1993, Part III) study Cournot competition when
quality improvements involve an increase in variable costs. While Gal-Or (1983) assumes in
her model that qualities and quantities are simultaneously chosen, Motta (1993, Part III)
assumes two stage competition. Motta (1993)assumes that the unit variable cost, adjusted
for quality, is increasing in quality level, and finds that the firms will choose to be different:
a low quality firm and a high quality firm. This result is consistent with those of Gal-Or
(though she uses a slightly different utility function).
Finally, we should mention a related paper with vertical product differentiation which
assumes monopolistic competition instead of oligopoly. Its authors, Fajgelbaum, Grossman
and Helpman (2011), consider an equilibrium model where firms choose among vertically
differentiated product qualities, and horizontally differentiated varieties. They assume that
in equilibrium, each firm chooses only one quality level q, where q belongs to a finite set
Q ≡ {q1, q2, ..., qm}.7 For any given q, there is a discrete set of varieties Jq. Each firm that
has chosen quality level q must decide which variety in the given set Jq it wants to specialize
in. By definition of monopolistic competition, each firm believes that its price does not affect
the demand facing any other firm.
Each consumer h has a given income, yh, and must allocate this income between a perfectly
divisible and homogeneous numeraire good (say, oat) and one unit of the differentiated good.
6This is in sharp constrast to Vives (1985) who show that Bertrand firms earn lower profits and Cournot
firms (under the assumption that product specifications are exogenous).
7In the simplest case, the set Q consists of only two quality levels, so that Q ≡ {H,L}.
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This unit can be of any quality q ∈ Q, and can be of any variety j ∈ Jq. The price of the
chosen variety, denoted by pj, is set by firm j ∈ Jq. The consumer pays pj for the unit of the
differentiated good, and thus her expenditure on the numeraire good is yh − pj. Call z this
expenditure on the numeraire good. The utility of the consumer is assumed to be
uh = zq + εhj where j ∈ Jq
where εhj is her idiosyncratic evaluation of the attributes of variety j. Each individualh has
a vector
εh ≡ (εh1 , εh2 , ..., εhF )
where F is the number of firms in the industry. The multiplicative term zq indicates that the
marginal utility of quality depends on how many units of the homogeneous good she consu-
mes, which of course depends on her income. This formulation implies that a person with a
higher income will value quality more.8 It is assumed that the vectors ε are independently
distributed according to a generalized extreme value (GEV) distribution, as in McFadden
(1978). For example, if there are two quality levels, H and L, and within each level, there
are two product varieties, then the GVE distribution is
G(ε) = e
−
(
e−(ε1/θH)+e−(ε2/θH)
)θH
× e−
(
e−(ε
′
1/θL)+e−(ε
′
2/θL)
)θL
where 0 < θH < 1 and 0 < θL < 1.
More generally,
G(ε) = exp
{
−
∑
q∈Q
χq
}
8This multiplicative formulation makes this paper different from the additive formulation in the industrial
organization literature, which follows McFadden (1978) and Berry et al. (1995).
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where
χq ≡
∑
j∈Jq
η
1/θj
j
θj and ηj ≡ e−εj , j ∈ Jq
It can be shown that under this GEV distribution,
(i) among all consumers who buy a product with quality q, the the percentage who buys
variety j in Jq is
ρj|q =
(
e−qpj/θq
) [ 1∑
i∈Jq e
−qpi/θq
]
(ii) among all consumers with income y, the fraction who buy quality q is
ρq(y) =
∑
i∈Jq
e−(y−pi)q/θq
θq × 1∑
ω∈Q
[∑
i∈Jω e
−(y−pi)ω/θω
]θω
(iii) among all consumers with income y, the fraction who choose variety j with quality
q is , for j ∈ Jq,
ρj(y) = ρj|q × ρq(y)
Fajgelbaum, Grossman and Helpman (2011) assume that θq is increasing in q. Under this
assumption, and standard assumptions on production costs, they show that richer countries
export higher quality goods.
3 The basic model
We consider an oligopoly with vertically differentiated products. Specifically, for simplicity,
we assume there are on two quality levels, denoted by SL and SH , where 0 < SL < SH .
9
In this section, we consider the simplest case: we assume for the moment that a firm must
9In this paper, we follow Johnson and Myatt (2006) by, in that we do not study how SH and SL are
determined. They are simply taken as given.
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either produce a high quality product, or a low quality product, but not both, and they incur
different set-up costs: a firm that wishes to produce a high quality product must incur a
higher set-up cost. In imposing the restriction that each firm is a single-product firm, our
basic model is similar to Gabszewicz and Thisse (1989, 1980) and Shaked and Sutton (1982,
1983); however while these authors assume that firms compete as Bertrand rivals, i.e., they
set prices, in our model we assume firms are Cournot rivals, i.e., they choose quantities.
In adopting Cournot competition, we follow Johnson and Myatt (2006). However, our
model differs from Johnson and Myatt (2006) in two important respects. First, Johnson
and Myatt (2006) assume that all firms have the same fixed cost, regardless of the quality
they produce. In contrast, in our models, fixed costs depend on the quality level: firms that
produce the high quality product must incur a higher fixed cost. The difference in fixed costs
play an important role in our model.
Our main focus is to determine the equilibrium prices and quantities, and the long-run
equilibrium number of firms.
3.1 Consumers
We assume there is a continuum of heterogeneous consumers. They differ from each other
in terms of their intensity of preference for quality, which is represented by a parameter θ,
where 0 ≤ θ ≤ θ. Let G(θ) denote the fraction of consumers whose intensity of preference
is smaller than or equal to θ. We assume that G(0) = 0, G(θ) = 1 and G′(θ) > 0 for all
θ ∈ (0, 1).
Each consumer buys at most one unit of the good. She must decide whether to buy one
unit of the high quality product, or one unit of the low quality product, or she does not
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buy any. A consumer of type θ places a value θSH on the consumption of a unit of the high
quality product, and a value θSL on the consumption of a unit of the low quality product. Let
PH (respectively, PL) denote the market price of the high quality product (respectively, low
quality product). Her net utility is θSH − PH or θSL − PL, depending on which product she
buys. If she does not buy either product, her net utility is zero. We assume that PH > PL.
Let us define the following ratios:
θL ≡ PL
SL
, θH ≡ PH
SH
, θI ≡ PH − PL
SH − SL (1)
In what follows, we assume that equilibrium prices are such that 0 < θL < θH < θI < θ.
10 It
is easy to show that
PH − PL
SH − SL >
PH
SH
⇐⇒ PL
SL
<
PH
SH
A consumer’s whose θ equals θL is indifferent between not buying the good and buying
a unit of the low quality product at the price PL. Similarly, a consumer’s whose θ equals θL
is indifferent between not buying the good and buying a unit of the high quality product at
the price PH . And a consumer with θ = θI will be indifferent between the two alternative
purchases.
The fraction of the population who purchases the high quality product is G(θ) − G(θI),
and the fraction who purchases the low quality product is G(θI) − G(θL), and the fraction
who does not buy the good is G(θL) > 0.
3.2 Producers
We assume that any firm that wants to produce the high quality product must incur an
upfront cost (or set-up cost) FH , and any firm that wants to produce the low quality
10For example, if θ = 2, SL = 1, SH = 2, PL = 1, PH = 2.2 then θL = 1, θH = 1.1, θI = 1.2
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product must incur FL, where 0 < FL < FH . These are entry costs to the market. They may
correspond to the cost of purchasing equipment, or possibly R&D costs. In this section, we
assume that a firm that incurs FH can only produce the high quality product, and a firm
that incurs FL can only produce the low quality product. After entry, firms choose their
output level and compete as Cournot rivals. The marginal production costs for high and low
quality products are CH and CL respectively. We assume that the marginal cost of a product
is lower than its valuation by the consumer with the highest θ:
CH < θSH and CL < θSH
We will solve for both the short-run and the long-run equilibrium. In the short-run, the
number of firms of each types are fixed at nL and nH , and there are no entry nor exit: the
firms have incurred their set-up costs FL and FH , and they make their output decisions,
competing as Cournot rivals. We solve for the Cournot equilibrium output of each type of
product, and the resulting short-run equilibrium prices PH and PL. Gross profits (before
subtracting the entry costs) can then be calculated. In the long run, free entry and exit
implies that net profit of each firm is zero. The zero-profit conditions determine the long-run
equilibrium number of firms. (As usual in this literature, we ignore the integer problem.)
3.3 Short-run Cournot equilibrium with two types of firms
In the short run, we take nH and nL as given. Cournot rivalry means that firms determine
their outputs, knowing that the market prices will be determined by the industry outputs of
each product. Firms take the inverse demand functions as given. Let us specify the inverse
demand functions.
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3.3.1 The inverse demand functions
Let N denote the mass of consumers. Given the prices PL and PH , we can compute θI and
θL as functions of (PL, PH). The number of consumers who demand the high quality product
is
XH = N
[
G(θ)−G(θI(PL, PH))
]
(2)
and the number of consumers who demand the low quality product is
XL = N [G(θI)−G(θL(PL, PH))] (3)
From these demand functions, we can compute the inverse demand functions
PH = PH(XH , XL) (4)
PL = PL(XH , XL) (5)
In order to obtain an explicit solution, let us assume that the distribution of θ is uniform
over the interval
[
0, θ
]
. Then
G(θ) = θ/θ for θ ∈ [0, θ]
Equations (2) and (3) become
XH = N
[
θ
θ
− θI
θ
]
=
N
θ
[
θ − PH − PL
SH − SL
]
(6)
XL = N
[
θI
θ
− θL
θ
]
=
N
θ
[
PH − PL
SH − SL −
PL
SL
]
(7)
These equations yield the inverse demand functions
PH =
(
1− XH
N
)
θSH − XL
N
θSL (8)
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PL =
(
1− XH
N
− XL
N
)
θSL (9)
Then
∂PH
∂XH
= −θSH
N
,
∂PH
∂XL
=
θSL
N
,
∂PL
∂XL
=
∂PL
∂XH
= −θSL
N
(10)
3.3.2 The output decision and market equilibrium in the short run
Let xiH denote the output of the high-quality firm i, and X
−i
H denote the sum of outputs of
all other high-quality firms. The high-quality firm i chooses xiH to maximize its profit, taking
X−iH and XL as given
maxpiiH = x
i
H
[
PH(X
−i
H + x
i
H , XL)− CH
]
(11)
The first order condition for an interior equilibrium is11
[
PH(X
−i
H + x
i
H , XL)− CH
]
+ xiH
∂PH(X
−i
H + x
i
H , XL)
∂XH
= 0 (12)
Similarly, for any low-quality firm j, the corresponding first order condition is
[
PL(XH , X
−j
L + x
j
l )− CL
]
+ xjL
∂PL(XH , X
−j
L + x
j
L)
∂XL
= 0 (13)
In a symmetric equilibrium, xiH = (1/nH)XH and x
j
L = (1/nL)XL. Substituting into the two
first order conditions, we obtain a system of two equations that determines the equilibrium
outputs, X∗H and X
∗
L, for given nL and nH
[PH(XH , XL)− CH ] + XH
nH
∂PH(XH , XL)
∂XH
= 0 (14)
[PL(XH , XL)− CL] + XL
nL
∂PL(XH , XL)
∂XL
= 0 (15)
11We restrict attention to interior equilibrium outputs for simplicity.
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Thus the optimal output of the representative high-quality firm and that of the low quality
firms are
x∗H =
[PH(X
∗
H , X
∗
L)− CH ]
−∂PH(X∗H ,X∗L)
∂XH
, x∗L =
[PL(X
∗
H , X
∗
L)− CL]
−∂PL(X∗H ,X∗L)
∂XL
(16)
Substituting (16) into the profit function (11) we can expressed the firm’s profit in terms of
its equilibrium output:
pi∗H = −
∂PH(X
∗
H , X
∗
L)
∂XH
(x∗H)
2 =
θSH (x
∗
H)
2
N
, pi∗L = −
∂PL(X
∗
H , X
∗
L)
∂XL
(x∗L)
2 =
θSL (x
∗
L)
2
N
(17)
Substituting into (14) and (15) yields the following system of equations(
1− XH
N
)
θSH − XL
N
θSL − CH = θSH
N
XH
nH
(18)
(
1− XH
N
− XL
N
)
θSL − CL = θSL
N
XL
nL
(19)
Dividing both sides of eq. (18) by θSH/NnH and both sides of eq. (19) by θSL/NnL, we
obtain
nHN(1− cH)− nNXH − knHXL = XH (20)
nLN(1− cL)− nHXH − nLXL = XL (21)
where
cH ≡ CH
θSH
< 1, cL ≡ CL
θSL
< 1 and k ≡ SL
SH
< 1 (22)
Solving, we obtain the equilibrium outputs as functions of cL, cH , k, nL, nH and N
X∗H = nHN
((1− cH)(1 + nL)− k(1− cL)nL)
1 + nH + nL + (1− k)nHnL (23)
X∗L = nLN
((1− cL)(1 + nH)− (1− cH)nH)
1 + nH + nL + (1− k)nHnL (24)
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Substituting the equilibrium outputs into eqs (8) and (9) we obtain the equilibrium prices
P ∗H =
[
1− 1
N
X∗H −
k
N
X∗L
]
θSH
P ∗L =
[
1− 1
N
X∗H −
1
N
X∗L
]
θSL
Each high-quality firm’s equilibrium output is
x∗H =
X∗H
nH
= (N)
((1− cH)(1 + nL)− k(1− cL)nL)
1 + nH + nL + (1− k)nHnL
and, using (17), its profit is
pi∗H = θSHN
(
(1− cH)(1 + nL)− k(1− cL)nL
1 + nH + nL + (1− k)nHnL
)2
(25)
Similarly,
pi∗L = θSLN
(
(1− cL)(1 + nH)− (1− cH)nH
1 + nH + nL + (1− k)nHnL
)2
(26)
3.4 The long-run free-entry equilibrium
In the long-run equilibrium, free entry and exit ensure that each firm’s net profit is zero.
The zero-profit conditions determine the number of high-quality producers and low-quality
producers. To solve for the equilibrium number of firms nL and nH , we equate the profit
(before subtracting the fixed cost) for each of type of firm with the corresponding fixed cost:
pi∗H = FH
pi∗L = FL
Using the definitions
fH =
FH
θSH
and fL =
FL
θSL
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the zero profit conditions become(
(1− cH)(1 + nL)− k(1− cL)nL
1 + nH + nL + (1− k)nHnL
)2
=
fH
N
(27)
(
(1− cL)(1 + nH)− (1− cH)nH
1 + nH + nL + (1− k)nHnL
)2
=
fL
N
(28)
3.4.1 The special case when quality-adjusted marginal costs are the same for
both products
In this sub-section, we solve for the long-run equilibrium number of firms of each type, under
the assumption that the quality-adjusted marginal costs are identical, cH = cL = c. Then
(nL − knL + 1)2
(nH + nL + nHnL(1− k) + 1)2
=
fH
(1− c)N (29)
1
(nH + nL + nHnL(1− k) + 1)2
=
fL
(1− c)N (30)
Dividing the first equation by the second equation, we get
(nL − knL + 1)2 = fH
fL
≡ β
i.e.
nL(1− k) + 1 =
√
β
Thus
nL =
√
β − 1
1− k (31)
Notice that nL > 0 if and only if fH > fL.
Next, use (30) to get
nH (1 + (1− k)nL) + (nL + 1) =
√
(1− c)N√
fL
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nH
√
β =
(1− k)√(1− c)N/fL + k −√β
(1− k)
nH =
(1− k)√(1− c)N + k√fL −√fH
(1− k)√fH
(32)
3.4.2 Main results for the basic model
For ease of references, we state the following Lemmas.
Lemma 1 (The case where marginal production costs are proportional to pro-
duct quality)
Assume cH = cL = c ≥ 0. In the long run equilibrium (zero profits for both types of
firms),
(i) the low quality product is supplied (nL > 0) only if FH/SH > FL/SL, i.e., the set-up
cost per unit of quality is increasing in quality level.
(ii) an increase in the market size, N , will increase the number of high-quality firms but
leave the number of low-quality firms unchanged.
The total number of firms in the long-run equilibrium is
nL + nH =
(1− k)√(1− c)N/fH + k√fL/fH +√fH/fL
1− k
Clearly the total number of firms increases in the market size. The the ratio of number of
low-quality firms to the the total number of firms is
RL =
√
fH/fL − 1
(1− k)√(1− c)N/fH + k√fL/fH +√fH/fL
This ratio decreases in N .
The ratio of the number of high-quality firms to the the total number of firms is RH =
1−RL, and it increases in the market size.
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Now consider the quantities sold. From (??) and (??) the total quantity sold is
X∗H +X
∗
L = (1− c)N
(nH + nL + (1− k)nHnL)
1 + (nH + nL + (1− k)nHnL)
The ratio of X∗L to total quantity sold is
ML =
X∗L
X∗H +X
∗
L
=
1
nH
nL
+ 1 + (1− k)nH
Since nL does not change with N , and nH increases in N , we conclude that ML falls as N
increases. Thus we can state:
Lemma 2: Assume cL = cH = c, and fH > fL. As the market size increases, the share
of high-quality firms, nN/(nH + nL), increases, and so does their market share (in quantity
terms), X∗H/(X
∗
H +X
∗
L)
What about the market share in value terms?
Lemma 3: Assume cL = cH = c and fH > fL. The equilibrium prices in the long-run
equilibrium are:
PL = θSL
(
1
1 + nH + nL + (1− k)nHnL
)
=
θSL
√
fL√
(1− c)N (33)
PH = θSH
(
1 + (1− k)nL
1 + nH + nL + (1− k)nHnL
)
=
θSH
√
fH√
(1− c)N (34)
They fall as the market size expands. However their ratio, PH/PL, is independent of the
market size, N :
PH
PL
=
(
SH
SL
)√
fH
fL
>
(
SH
SL
)
> 1
The market shares of low-quality sales is
PLXL
PHXH + PLXL
=
knL
nH (nL(1− k) + 1)2 + knL
=
knL
nHβ + knL
(35)
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As the market size N increases, nH increases but nL is unchanged, and the market share of
low-quality sales (in value terms) decreases.
Proof: omitted.
From Lemmas 1 to 3, we can state
Proposition1: Assume the marginal cost per unit of quality is constant, i.e., cH = cL =
c, and fH > fL. In a Cournot oligopoly with free entry and exit, in equilibrium the relative
price PL/PH is independent of the market size. As the market size increases, the prices PL
and PH both decrease by the same proportion, and the market share (in value terms) of the
high quality product increases. Welfare of each type of consumer increases.
Remark: Welfare increases because the prices fall. The fraction of the market served by
the oligopoly rises, because θL ≡ PL/SL falls. The fraction of the market that is supplied
by the high-quality producer rises, because θI ≡ (PH − PL)/(SH − SL) falls, while PL/PH is
unchanged. In fact, in the long run equilibrium (with free entry and exit), we have
PH
PL
=
(
SH
SL
)
(1 + nL (1− k)) (independent of N)
XL
XH
=
nL
nH + (1− k)nHnL (falls as N rises)
θI =
PH − PL
SH − SL =
(
1+nL(1−k)
k
− 1
)
PL
SH − SL (falls as N rises)
4 Commitment to product lines
In the preceding section, we consider a Cournot oligopoly with both high and low quality
products, under the assumption that a firm produces either the high quality product, or the
low quality product, but not both.
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We now relax that single-product-firm assumption, and allow each firm to choose bet-
ween producing both quality levels, or only one. The solution turns out to depend on the
relationship among the technological parameters, namely the fixed costs per unit of quality,
FH/SH and FL/SL, and the unit variable costs per unit of quality, CH/SH and CL/SL. In
what follows, we consider only two cases. In Case 1, we assume that the technology has the
following properties: (i) CH ≥ CL, and (ii) higher quality requires higher fixed cost per unit
of quality but implies lower unit variable cost per unit of quality, i.e.
FH
SH
≥ FL
SL
and
CH
SH
≤ CL
SL
(36)
The assumption that CH ≥ CL and eq. (36) imply CL/SH ≤ CH/SH ≤ CL/SL.
In Case 2, we assume that (a) FH = FL = F > 0, which implies that FH/SH < FL/SL,
and (b) CH/SH > CL/SL. Note that Johnson and Myatt (2006) assume FH = FL = F
throughout their analysis.
As before, we define
fH =
FH
θSH
, fL =
FL
θSL
, cH =
CH
θSH
, cL =
CL
θSL
Then in Case 1, fH ≥ fL and cH ≤ cL, and we say that in this case, the “quality-adjusted
fixed cost” increases with quality upgrading, and the “quality-adjusted unit variable cost”
decreases with quality upgrading. In Case 2, the reverses hold.
4.1 Case 1: higher quality requires higher fixed cost (per unit of
quality) and involves lower variable cost (per unit of quality)
We now consider in detail Case 1, defined as the following cost configuration:
fH ≥ fL and cH ≤ cL (37)
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That is, the quality-adjusted fixed cost is higher for the high quality product, and the quality-
adjusted variable cost is strictly lower for the high quality product. We assume that any firm
j that has invested only FL is not able to produce the high-quality product. Its output of
the low quality product is denoted by xjL. In contrast, we assume that any firm i that has
invested FH can produce both quality levels. Its outputs are denoted by x
i
H and x
i
L.
Let us establish an important Lemma:
Lemma 4 Assume cH ≤ cL. Any firm that has invested FH and is able to produce both
products will find it optimal to specialize in the high quality product.
Proof: see the appendix.
In what follows, we assume cH < cL (because the borderline case where cH = cL has been
considered in the previous section). Then, due to Lemma 4, all firms that have invested FH
will specialize in the high quality product, and all firms that have invested FL will specialize
in the low quality product.
Given nL and nH , the equilibrium outputs are
X∗H
N
=
(1− cH)nH(1 + nL)− k(1− cL)nHnL
1 + nH + nL + (1− k)nHnL =
zHnH(1 + nL)− kzLnHnL
1 + nH + nL + (1− k)nHnL (38)
X∗L
N
=
(1− cL)nL(1 + nH)− (1− cH)nHnL
1 + nH + nL + (1− k)nHnL =
zLnL(1 + nH)− zHnHnL
1 + nH + nL + (1− k)nHnL (39)
where zi ≡ 1− ci, and zH > zL.
Now we must determine the equilibrium number of each type of firm, under free entry.
Zero profits imply (
1− X
∗
H
N
− kX
∗
L
N
− cH
)
X∗H
N
=
nHfH
N
≡ nHgH (40)(
1− X
∗
H
N
− X
∗
L
N
− cL
)
X∗L
N
=
nLfL
N
≡ nLgL (41)
26
From (40) we obtain
nH =
zH −
√
fH/N + nL
(
zH − kzL −
√
fH/N
)
(1 + nL(1− k))
√
fH/N
(42)
Using (41) and (42) we obtain
nL =
zL
√
β + nH(zL − zH)
√
β − zH
zH − kzL (43)
=
zL(
√
β + nH
√
β)− zH(1 + nH
√
β)
zH − kzL
In Diagram 1, Curve 2 depicts equation (43): it has a negative slope. Curve 1 depicts
equation (42). Its slope is given by
dnH
dnL
=
k
[√
N
fH
(
CL
θSL
− CH
θSH
)
− 1
]
(1 + nL(1− k))2
This slope can be positive or negative. Thus we must consider two sub-cases
4.1.1 Subcase (i): Curve 1 has a negative slope (the market size is not too large)
The slope of Curve 1 is negative iff
zH − zL ≡ cL − cH <
√
fH
N
(44)
i.e., if N is not too big. Assuming that condition (44) is satisfied, we can show that the
Curve 1 is strictly convex. Then Curve 1 and Curve 2 intersect at most once in the positive
orthant.
Diagram 1. Equilibrium number of the firms with different quality levels, downwards sloping
of Curve 1
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For a given nL, an increase in N will shift Curve 1 up.
The vertical intercept of Curve 1 is
y1 =
zH −√gH√
gH
(45)
this intercept is positive iff
zH >
√
gH (46)
and the horizontal intercept is
x1 =
zH −√gH√
gH − (zH − kzL) (47)
Assuming zH >
√
gH , the horizontal intercept is positive iff
zH −√gH < kzL (48)
Now, consider Curve 2. Since by assumption zH ≥ zL, at nH = 0, we have nL > 0 only
if β is sufficiently large, such that √
β > zH − zL
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We can rewrite eq (43) as follows:
nH =
(
zL
√
β − zH
)− nL(zH − kzL)
(zH − zL)
√
β
(49)
Curve 2 is a straight-line with negative slope. The vertical intercept of Curve 2 is
y2 =
(
zL
√
β − zH
)
(zH − zL)
√
β
(50)
This intercept is positive iff
zL
√
β − zH > 0 (51)
The horizontal intercept is
x2 =
zL
√
β − zH
(zH − kzL) (52)
It is positive iff zL
√
β − zH > 0.
In brief, there exists a unique equilibrium with nH > 0 and nL > 0 (as drawn in the
Figure) if we assume the following conditions:
First, we require that y2 > y1 , i.e.
0 < cL − cH <
√
fH
N
−
√
fL
N
(53)
Second, we require that x1 > x2
zH −√gH√
gH − (zH − kzL) >
zL
√
β − zH
(zH − kzL) > 0 (54)
Recall that previously we have also made the following requirements
zH −√gH > 0 (55)
√
gH − (zH − kzL) > 0 (56)
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(Note: if condition (53) is satisfied, than condition (56) is satisfied),
zL
√
β − zH > 0, i.e.
√
fH/fL >
zH
zL
≡ 1− cH
1− cL > 1 (57)
and
zH − zL > 0 i.e. cH < cL (58)
Note that (58) and (56) allow us to re-write (54) as
(zH − kzL) (zH −√gH)− (√gH − (zH − kzL))
(
zL
√
β − zH
)
> 0
which is equivalent to √
fH/N − k
√
fL/fH < zH − kzL (59)
i.e., √
fN√
N
< (1− cH)− k(1− cL) + k
√
fL
fH
(60)
Now consider a small increase in N . Curve 2 is not affected by N . An increase in N will
shift Curve 1 upwards. The result is that the intersection point of the two curves will move
up along Curve 2, implying an increase in the number of high quality firms and a decrease
in the number of low quality firms. The ratio X∗L/X
∗
H is, from (38) and (39),
X∗L
X∗H
=
zL(
1
nH
+ 1)− zH
zH(
1
nL
+ 1)− kzL
When nL falls and nH rises, the denominator gets larger and the numerator gets smaller,
implying that in quantity terms, the market share of the low quality product falls.
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From the above analysis, we obtain the following Proposition, under the assumption that
Curve 1 has a negative slope, i.e.,
0 < cL − cH <
√
fH/N (61)
Proposition 2: Assume cH < cL, and cL − cH <
√
fH/N. There exists a unique
Cournot equilibrium with n∗H > 0 and n
∗
L > 0 such that each type of firms optimally commit
to specialize in high or low quality products, provided the additional assumptions (i) to (v)
below hold. Furthermore, an increase in the market size will increase the number of high-
quality firms, decrease the number of low-quality firms, and decrease the market share of the
low quality product.
(i) Large increment in fixed cost for quality upgrade, FH/SH > FL/SL
(ii) The higher quality product has higher unit variable cost, CH > CL, but lower quality-
adjusted unit variable cost, i.e., CH/SH < CL/SL.
(iii) The ratio of quality-adjusted fixed costs, fH/fL is sufficiently great relative to the
ratio (1− cH)/(1− cL), i.e. condition (57) holds.
(iv) The market size, N , is not too large:
1− cH >
√
fH
N
> (1− cH)− SL
SH
(1− cL) (62)
(v) Conditions (53) and (60) hold:
cL − cH <
√
fH
N
−
√
fL
N
(63)
√
fH
N
< (1− cH)− SL
SH
(1− cL) + k
√
fL
fH
(64)
31
4.1.2 Subcase (ii): Curve 1 has a positive slope (The market size is large)
Now, we turn to the case where the slope of Curve 1 is positive. This is depicted in Diagram
2. Curve 1 has a positive slope iff
zH − zL ≡ cL − cH >
√
fH
N
(65)
Then, if condition (65) is met, we have
zH −√gH > zL
and the vertical intercept of Curve 1 is
y′1 =
zH −√gH√
gH
>
zL√
fH/N
> 0
If y′1 is smaller than y2 (the vertical intercept of Curve 2), then there will be a unique
intersection with both nL > 0 and nH > 0. Thus, if in addition to (65) we assume that
y′1 ≡
zH −√gH√
gH
<
(
zL
√
β − zH
)
(zH − zL)
√
β
≡ y2 (66)
then we have an interior Cournot equilibrium. Since we are dealing with the case where
zH > zL, condition (66) is equivalent to
zH(zH − 1− zL)− zL
√
fH/fL < (zH − zL)
√
fH/N (67)
This condition is satisfied if N is small enough.
Diagram 2. Equilibrium number of the firms with different quality levels, upwards sloping of
Curve 1
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Thus we obtain the following Proposition, under the assumption that Curve 1 is upward
sloping, i.e., cL − cH >
√
fH/N .
Proposition 3: Assume cL − cH >
√
fH/N . There exists a unique Cournot equilibrium
with n∗H > 0 and n
∗
L > 0 such that each type of firms optimally commit to specialize in
high or low quality products, if the following additional assumptions on costs and market size
hold..Furthermore, an increase in the market size will increase the number of high-quality
firms, decrease the number of low-quality firms, and decrease the market share of the low
quality product.
(i) Large increment in fixed cost for quality upgrade, FH/SH > FL/SL
(ii) The higher quality product has higher unit variable cost, CH > CL, but lower quality-
adjusted unit variable cost, i.e., CH/SH < CL/SL.
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(iii) The following condition holds
(1− cH)(cL − cH − 1)− (1− cL)
√
fH/fL < (cL − cH)
√
fH/N
4.2 Case 2: The higher quality product requires higher variable
cost (per unit of quality), but does not require a larger fixed
cost
Now we turn to the opposite case: FH = FL and CH/SH > CL/SL. Johnson and Myatt
(2006, Section 5, Proposition 9) show that if there are only two possible quality levels with
the identical fixed costs FH = FL = F , in equilibrium no firm restricts itself to selling only
the low quality product. Thus, in this case the industry consists of n identical firms, each
producing both products. Applying this result to our model, we can solve for the equilibrium
output of each product, given that the number of firms is n, and the market size is N . The
first order conditions for each firm are(
1− 1
N
XH
)
− XL
N
k − xiH
1
N
− xiL
1
N
k =
CH
θSH
(68)
−xHi
1
N
+
(
1− 1
N
XH − 1
N
XL
)
− xiL
1
N
=
CL
θSL
(69)
Subtracting equation (69) from equation (68), we obtain
CH
θSH
− CL
θSL
=
1
N
(XL + x
i
L) (1− k) > 0
Under symmetry, we have
xiL =
XL
n
Then
cH − cL = XL
N
(
1 +
1
n
)
(1− k)
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XL∗
N
=
cH − cL(
1 + 1
n
)
(1− k) > 0 (70)
Re-write eq. (69) as
1− XH
N
(
1 +
1
n
)
− XL
N
(
1 +
1
n
)
=
CL
θSL
(71)
Thus
XH
N
(
1 +
1
n
)
=
1− k + (kcL − cH)
1− k
X∗H
N
=
(1− k)− (cH − kcL)(
1 + 1
n
)
(1− k) (72)
Thus X∗H > 0 iff
cH − kcL < 1− k
iff
k <
1− cH
1− cL < 1 (73)
From (70) and (72), the ratio of low quality output to high quality output is independent of
the market size, N.
The prices are
P ∗H =
[
1− 1
N
X∗H −
k
N
X∗L
]
θSH (74)
P ∗L =
[
1− 1
N
X∗H −
1
N
X∗L
]
θSL (75)
Thus, substituting (70) and (72) into (74) and (75) we obtain, after simplification,
P ∗H =
(
ncH + 1
n+ 1
)
θSH and P
∗
L =
(
ncL + 1
n+ 1
)
θSL (76)
Then, since this subsection deals with the case where cL < cH , we obtain
P ∗L
θSL
=
ncL + 1
n+ 1
<
ncH + 1
n+ 1
=
P ∗H
θSH
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and
P ∗L
P ∗H
=
k (ncL + 1)
(ncH + 1)
< 1
Thus, an increase in n leads to lower prices for both products, and a fall in the ratio P ∗L/P
∗
H .
The zero profit condition is
P ∗H
X∗H
N
+ P ∗L
X∗L
N
− CHX
∗
H
N
− CLX
∗
L
N
=
nF
N
(77)
This condition is equivalent to((
ncH + 1
n+ 1
)
θSH − CH
)(
1− k + (kcL − cH)(
1 + 1
n
)
(1− k)
)
+
((
ncL + 1
n+ 1
)
θSL − CL
)(
cH − cL(
1 + 1
n
)
(1− k)
)
=
nF
N
i.e., (
1− cH
n+ 1
)(
1− k + (kcL − cH)
(n+ 1)(1− k)
)
+ k
(
1− cL
n+ 1
)(
cH − cL
(n+ 1)(1− k)
)
=
F
NθSH
i.e.
∆
(1− k) (n+ 1)2 =
F
NθSH
where
∆ ≡ (1− cH) (1− k + (kcL − cH)) + k (1− cL) (cH − cL) > 0
Note that ∆ > 0 because we have assumed condition (73). The equilibrium number of firms
is
n∗ =
√
SHNθ∆
(1− k)F − 1
A doubling of the market size will increase the number of firms, but by a smaller proportion.
Proposition 4: Assume FL = FH = F , cH > cL,
SL
SH
< 1−cH
1−cL , and the fixed cost is small
relative to the market size N . Then
(i) in equilibrium, each will produce both low and high quality products.
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(ii) the long-run equilibrium number of firms is uniquely determined. An increase in the
market size will lead to a larger number of firms.
(iii) an increase in the market size will reduce PH , PL, and also the relative price PL/PH
(iv) an increase in the market size will reduce the value share of the low quality products,
PLXL/(PLXL +PHXH), but the ratio of outputs, XL/XH , is not affected by the market size.
4.3 Discussions
Our results show that, under free entry and exit, in a Cournot oligopoly that produces both
high and low quality products, there are two main gains from the expansion of the market size.
First, the prices fall, and thus more consumers are served. Second, the market share of the
high quality product increases, which implies that on average, consumers have greater access
to the higher quality product. We may say that the ‘average quality’s rises. The mechanism
differs, depending on the cost configuration. If the quality-adjusted fixed cost is higher for
the high quality product (fH > fL), and firms must specialize in one of the products, then, in
the case where the unit variable costs (adjusted for quality) are the same, cH = cL, when the
market size expands, more firms will enter the high-quality market segment, driving down the
price PH , and the low-quality product price PL also falls, but the ratio PL/PH is independent
of the market size.
When fH > fL but cH ≤ cL, we show that even if a firm that has incur FH is able to
produce both products, it would refrain from doing so. This is true even if the firm is making
a short run output decision, and even if it is a monopoly (Lemma 4). The reason is that
it is not worthwhile for a firm that is capable to produce both goods to to produce the low
quality product, at a high unit variable cost (adjusted for quality), cL ≥ cH , to compete
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with its own high quality product. In other words the firm is avoiding the phenomenon
called ‘cannibalization ’: producing the low quality good will lower its price, reducing the
demand for the high quality product. It follows that the assumption made in section 3
(that the high-quality firms produce only the high-quality product, when cL = cH = c) is in
fact justified. considering the case where fH > fL and cH < cL, we show that under some
additional restrictions, a long run equilibrium exists with two types of firms, each committed
to specialize in one type of product. When the market size expands, the effects are an increase
the number of high-quality firms, a decrease the number of low-quality firms, and a decrease
the market share of the low quality product.
We also consider the case where the fixed costs are the same for all firms regardless of
whether they produce the high quality product only, or the low quality product only, or both
products. In this case we show that all firms will produce both products, provided that the
quality adjusted unit variable cost of the high quality product is higher than that of the low
quality one, i.e., cH > cL. Thus the cannibalization effect is not too strong to discourage
the production of the low quality good in this case. We show that an increase in the market
size will reduce PH , PL, and also reduce the relative price PL/PH , as well as the value share
of the low quality products, PLXL/(PLXL + PHXH), however the ratio of the two outputs,
XL/XH , is unaffected.
The following diagram (diagram 3) summarizes the relationships among cost structure,
firms’ strategies, and market characteristics.
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Diagram 3. Cost structure, firms’ strategies, and the industrial structure
5 Some empirics
While this paper is primarily theoretical, in this section, we make a modest attempt to bring
the theory to the data. One of our theoretical prediction is that the price level is lower for
the larger market. Another one of our theoretical result is that if the quality-adjusted unit
variable cost is higher for the high quality product, then an increase in the size of the market
will increase the market share of the high quality product. Using data covering China’s
exporting firms for the two years 2001 and 2006, we test these predictions by exploring the
relationship between: (i) the average quality offered to an export market and the size of that
market; and (ii) product’s price offered by the single firm to an export market and the size
of that market. This data set is retrieved from the replicable data set of Fan et al. (2015).
The data sets contains a wide range of variables that are suitable for testing our hypothesis.
These include the price of the products supplied by each firm in each export market, the
volume of transaction, the the category of the products by the HS6 code. In addition, we
assemble the data that describe the macro characteristics of the destination countries using
the databases of the World Bank and the CEPII. These characteristics include GDP, per
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capita GDP, CPI, GINI index, and the import tariffs imposed by the destination countries.
In our empirical specifications, we must modify the theory by adding the assumption that
exporting to a market requires the firm to incur a set up cost for that market, and this cost
is increasing in the quality level of the products. We suppose that the export set-up cost is
country-specific, which may seem a reasonable assumption if tastes vary across countries.12
Furthermore, since there are no direct statistics on quality levels, we will use the average
price, after controlling for the average quantity, as a measure of the average quality. A
modest justification of this approach is as follows.
We consider a log form relationship between average price and average quality, based on
the inverse demand functions for each type of product:
lnPj = lnSj + ln
[
1− f(Xj)
]
+ ln
(
θj
)
+ constant j (78)
(where lnPj is the average of the logarithm of the prices of the products in market j, Xj is
the average quantity of the products13, lnSj is the average of the logarithm of the quality
of the products, which is expected to be an increasing function of the market size.) The
Appendix provides some justification for this formulation.
The actual test involves running the following regression model
lnPjkt = β1 ln (sizekt) + β2lnXjkt + Z
′
ktγ + ηj + ζt + εjkt (79)
where lnPjkt is the average export price level for product group j in country k in year t,
ln (sizekt) indexes the market size
14, lnXjkt is the average quantity of the product group j
exported to market k in year t, Zkt controls other characteristics of the destination markets,
12Di Comite et al. (2014) provide empirical support for this hypothesis.
13In the estimation, for simplicity we use the average value (in logarithm) to control this term.
14We use both GDP and population size as measures of the market size.
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ηj is the industry fixed effect, and ζt is the time fixed effect. The estimation results (Tables
1 and 2 in the Appendix) show that the average price in each country-industrial sector is
increasing in the market size.
6 Concluding remarks
This paper studies the Cournot equilibrium of an oligopoly with multiple product quality
under free entry and exit. The paper highlights the dependence of prices and average quality
on the market size. Firms must incur a set-up cost. In the first stage of the game, each
decides whether it will produce the low quality product or the high quality product. If the
set-up cost is independent of product quality, firms may choose to supply both types of
quality. We show that for the existence of an equilibrium where some firms specialize in the
low quality product it is necessary that the set-up cost for the lower quality product, adjusted
for quality level, is lower than that for the higher quality product. In the case where the
unit variable costs are zero, or they are proportional to quality level (so that unit variable
costs, adjusted for quality, are the same), we show that an increase in the market size leads
to (i) an increase in the fraction of firms that specialize in the high quality products, (ii)
the market shares (both in value terms and in terms of volume of output) of high quality
producers increases, and (iii) the prices of both types of product decrease. In the case where
higher quality requires higher set up cost (per unit of quality) but lower unit variable cost
(per unit of quality), subject to certain bounds on the difference in unit variable costs, we
obtain the result that an increase in the market size decreases the number of low quality
firms, increases the number of high quality firms, and decreases the prices of both products.
In the special case where the set up cost is independent of quality level, we find that all firms
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will produce both type of quality levels. In this case, an increase in the market size will
reduce the value shares of low quality products, but will leave their volume share unchanged.
Both the relative price PL/PH and the nominal prices PH and PL fall.
We carry out an empirical test of a version of the model, where set-up costs now refer to
set-up costs to establish an export market, and they vary according to the quality of product
that the firm exports to that market. We show that the data supported the hypothesis that
the average prices of the product are lower for bigger export markets.
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Appendix
Proof of Lemma 4
The inverse demand functions are
PH =
(
1− 1
N
XH
)
θSH − XL
N
θSL
PL =
(
1− 1
N
XH − 1
N
XL
)
θSL
Suppose firm i has incurred the fixed cost FH in stage 1. Then in stage 2, firm i’s optimization
problem is to choose xiH ≥ 0 and xiL ≥ 0 to maximize
(PH − CH)xiH + (PL − CL)xiL
The F.O.C. with respect to xiH is
(PH − CH) + xiH
∂PH
∂XH
+ xiL
∂PL
∂XH
≤ 0 ( = 0 if xiH > 0)
and the F.O.C. with respect to xiL is
xiH
∂PH
∂XL
+ (PL − CL) + xiL
∂PL
∂XL
≤ 0 ( = 0 if xiL > 0)
Thus, if both xiH and x
i
L are positive, then we must have(
1− 1
N
XH
)
θSH − XL
N
θSL − CH − xiH
1
N
θSH − xiL
1
N
θSL = 0
−xHi
1
N
θSL +
(
1− 1
N
XH − 1
N
XL
)
θSL − CL − xiL
1
N
θSL = 0
i.e. , with k = SL/SH < 1,(
1− 1
N
XH
)
− XL
N
k − CH
θSH
− xiH
1
N
− xiL
1
N
k = 0
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−xHi
1
N
+
(
1− 1
N
XH − 1
N
XL
)
− CL
θSL
− xiL
1
N
= 0
i.e. (
1− 1
N
XH
)
− XL
N
k − xiH
1
N
− xiL
1
N
k =
CH
θSH
(A.1)
−xHi
1
N
+
(
1− 1
N
XH − 1
N
XL
)
− xiL
1
N
=
CL
θSL
(A.2)
Subtracting (A.2) from (A.1) and using eq. (36) we obtain
CH
θSH
− CL
θSL
=
1
N
(XL + x
i
L) (1− k) > 0
which cannot hold, since we have assumed that CH
θSH
− CL
θSL
≤ 0. Q.E.D.
Justification for equation (78)
Let us explain how we arrived at equation (78). Using the results in our theoretical part,
we have the following inverse demand functions in log forms
lnPH = lnSH + ln θ + ln
(
1− X
∗
H
N
− kX
∗
L
N
)
(A.3)
lnPL = lnSL + ln θ + ln
(
1− X
∗
H
N
− X
∗
L
N
)
(A.4)
We define the average value of any variable y (be it price, quantity, or quality) by
y =
nH
nH + nL
yH +
nL
nH + nL
yL
Then
X =
nH
nH + nL
X∗H +
nL
nH + nL
X∗L
From (A.3) and (A.4)
nH lnPH = nH lnSH + nH ln θ + nH ln
(
1− X
∗
H
N
− kX
∗
L
N
)
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nL lnPL = nL lnSL + nL ln θ + nL ln
(
1− X
∗
H
N
− X
∗
L
N
)
Adding these two equations, and dividing both sides by nH + nL, we get
lnP = lnS + ln θ +
nH
nH + nL
ln
(
1− X
∗
H
N
− kX
∗
L
N
)
+
nL
nH + nL
ln
(
1− X
∗
H
N
− X
∗
L
N
)
(A.5)
Then eq (A.5) can be rearranged as follows
lnP = lnS + ln
(
θ
)
+ ln
[
1−
(
X∗H
N
+
X∗L
N
)]
+RH ln v (A.6)
where RH ≡ nH/(nH + nL) and
v ≡ 1−
X∗H
N
− kX∗L
N
1− X∗H
N
− X∗L
N
> 1
Recall that in we have found that there is a monotone increasing (but not linear) relati-
onship between the equilibrium number of firms, nH + nL, and the market size. Therefore
we can approximate the term
(
X∗H
N
+
X∗L
N
)
in eq. (A.6) by some function f(X).
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Table 1. Average price and the economic size
(1) (2) (3)
VARIABLES ln(price) ln(price) ln(price)
ln(GDP ) 0.03907*** 0.0533*** 0.0621***
(0.0017) (0.00159) 0.003309
ln(quantity) -0.141*** -0.215***
(0.00103) (0.00222)
ln(GDP per capita) 0.00758
(0.00868)
ln(CPI) 0.0259***
(0.006403)
GINI -0.0506***
(0.0005641)
Tariff−rate 0.0506
(0.0832)
Constant -0.311 1.0104*** 10.535***
(0.397) (0.372) (0.8404)
Observations 137,677 137,677 44,229
R-squared 0.8416 0.8609 0.8756
Time FE YES YES YES
Variety FE YES YES YES
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 2. Average price and the population size
(1) (2) (3)
VARIABLES ln(price) ln(price) ln(price)
ln(population) 0.0159*** 0.0415*** 0.0621***
(0.00174) (0.00158) (0.003309)
ln(quantity) -0.214*** -0.215***
(0.00126) (0.00222)
ln(GDP per capita) 0.0696***
(0.00799)
ln(CPI) 0.0259***
(0.006403)
GINI -0.00507***
(0.000564)
Tariff−rate 0.0506
(0.0832)
Constant 0.455 2.5906*** 0.535
(0.395) (0.358) (0.8404)
Observations 133,598 133,598 44,229
R-squared 0.8406 0.8697 0.8756
Time FE YES YES YES
Variety FE YES YES YES
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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